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The American way of waging war has changed significantly in the 
past two decades. Following the Cold War, the military began to use 
private military firms, or PMFs, to support and supplant many of its 
functions.1 The U.S. military’s 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq 
was accompanied by another army, one of contractors, who would 
help stabilize and rebuild the country.2 At their highest numbers, there 
were approximately 150,000 contractors in the Iraqi warzone, and 
approximately 30,000 of those were authorized to carry weapons and 
performed many quasi-military functions.3 The only distinction 
between them and their army counterparts was their placement outside 
of the chain-of-command. While they were nominally within the 
                                                 
∗ J.D. candidate, May 2012, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology. The author wishes to thank Xiomara Angulo and Matthew Savin for 
their assistance and advice on this topic. 
1 Laura A. Dickinson, Government for Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and 
the Problem of Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
135, 149 (2005). 
2 Jonathan Finer, Recent Developments, Holstering the Hired Guns: New 
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chain-of-command because of the contracts they operated under, an 
individual contractor did not have to follow orders from a military 
official.4 
The recently vacated Seventh Circuit case of Vance v. Rumsfeld 
arises from this setting.5 In that case, two American citizens working 
for an Iraqi PMF were detained by the U.S. military and subjected to 
sleep deprivation and repeated interrogations.6 They had reported on 
the illegal activities of the PMF which they worked for and were 
detained to determine if they were a “security threat.” After being 
released and returning to the United States, they filed suit against 
Donald Rumsfeld and other military officials, alleging that their 
Eighth Amendment constitutional rights had been violated and that 
they were entitled to a remedy of damages under Bivens v. Six 
Unknown Named Agents.7 Although Bivens remedies have been 
allowed for violation of a citizen’s Eighth Amendment rights while on 
U.S. soil8, no court had been presented with the question of whether 
U.S. citizens are entitled to a Bivens remedy when their Eighth 
Amendment rights are violated in a warzone.9 
This Comment will argue that the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in 
Vance failed to adequately address “special factors” that should 
preclude a Bivens remedy for security contractors working for Private 
Military Firms (PMFs). It will do so by examining the rise of PMFs; 
what laws they operate under; and how they were used in Iraq 
following Operation Iraqi Freedom. It will then chart the Supreme 
Court’s creation of implied rights of action under Bivens and their 
application to the military. It summarizes and analyzes the portion of 
the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Vance, which dealt with the Bivens 
                                                 
4 Dickinson, supra note 1, at 199–200. 
5 Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591, reh’g en banc granted, opinion vacated, 
Nos. 10-1687, 10-2442 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011). 
6 Id. at 594. 
7 Id.; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971). 
8 Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007). 
9 Other Federal Circuits have held that noncitizens are not entitled to a Bivens 
remedy for a violation of Eighth Amendment rights. See, e.g., Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 
F.3d 762, (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009). 
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special factors analysis and proposes alternative grounds for why the 
Seventh Circuit should have stayed its hand in creating a Bivens 
remedy. 
 
I. THE RISE OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS AND THEIR USE IN IRAQ 
 
A. The Rise of Private Military Firms 
 
Between the first and second Gulf Wars10, the U.S. military’s use 
of private contractors has significantly increased. This is largely due to 
the Department of Defense determination that “[o]nly those functions 
that must be performed by DoD should be kept by DoD.”11 The 
Department of Defense divides its functions into three separate 
categories: those directly linked to warfighting; those indirectly linked 
to warfighting; and those not linked to warfighting.12 The Department 
of Defense is willing to share all functions with the private sector. 
However, it has determined to aggressively privatize and outsource the 
second two categories.13 The Department of Defense’s determination 
to privatize and outsource entire functions led to the ratio of 
contractors to troops to be approximately one to one hundred in the 
first Gulf War14 and one to ten in the second Gulf War.15 This led The 




                                                 
10 Officially known as The Persian Gulf War (August 2, 1990 – February 28, 
1991) and the Iraq War (March 20, 2003 – December 31, 2011). 
11 Department of Defense, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Sept. 30, 
2001, at 61, available at http://www.dod.gov/pubs/qdr2001.pdf. 
12 Id. at 61–62. 
13 Id. 
14 George Cahlink, Army of Contractors, GOV’T EXECUTIVE, Feb. 1, 2002, at 
43, available at http://www.govexec.com/features/0202/0202s5.htm 
15 Peter W. Singer, War, Profits, and the Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military 
Firms and International Law, 42 COLUM J. TRANSNAT’L L. 521, 523 (2004). 
16 Military Industrial Complexities, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2003, at 56. 
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B. The Laws Under Which Private Military Firms Operate 
 
PMFs operate in the areas between the laws of their home nation, 
the nation where they are operating, and the international sphere.17 For 
American citizens working for PMFs, this includes: contract law, the 
Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (“MEJA”), and the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”).18 For the purposes of this 
Comment, only the UCMJ will be examined. In Iraq, contractors fell 
into a “legal loophole” that placed them outside the typical “gray area” 
in which they operate, so Congress enacted the John Warner National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, which amended 
10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10).19 The amendment expanded the UCMJ to 
cover civilians “accompanying the force” during “contingency 
operation[s].”20 Although the Supreme Court case of Reid v. Covert,21 
held that subjecting civilian spouses to UCMJ jurisdiction was 
unconstitutional, a careful and in-depth analysis of the amendment 
concluded that courts would find it constitutional.22 All American 
citizens working for a PMF in Iraq are therefore subject to the 
UCMJ.23 
 
C. The Use Of Private Military Firms In Iraq 
 
Contractors supporting the military in Iraq can be placed into one 
of three groups: those that provide support; those that provide 
                                                 
17 Cara-Ann M. Hamaguchi, Recent Developments, Between War and Peace: 
Exploring the Constitutionality of Subjecting Private Civilian Contractors to the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice During “Contingency Operations,” 86 N.C. L. 
REV. 1047, 1048 (2008). 
18 See generally Charles Tiefer, No More Nisour Squares: Legal Control of 
Private Security Contractors in Iraq and After, 88 OR. L. REV. 745 (2009). 
19 Hamaguchi, supra note 17, at 1048–50. 
20 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2000), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 552, 120 
Stat. 2083, 2217 (2007). 
21 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5 (1957). 
22 Hamaguchi, supra note 17, at 1064–66. 
23 Id. at 1050. 
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consulting; and the “military provider firms” that are authorized to 
carry arms and perform quasi-military roles.24 At their highest levels, 
there were approximately 30,000 armed security contractors who 
protected convoys, state officials and diplomats, Army Corps of 
Engineers units, and military compounds.25 Therefore, they performed 
almost all normal duties of a military combat unit while being outside 
the military chain-of-command. While the PMF employing the 
contractors may have been limited because of contract law principles, 
the contractors themselves did not have to follow orders from a 
military official.26 
 
II – IMPLIED RIGHTS OF ACTION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 
 
A. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents 
 
In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, the United States 
Supreme Court held that an individual is entitled to a private cause of 
action when federal officials violate a constitutional right, even if no 
statute explicitly created such a cause of action.27 The Bivens Court 
noted that “where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has 
been the rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their 
remedies so as to grant necessary relief.”28 Having determined that 
courts could create a remedy in such circumstances, it stated that, 
“damages have been regarded as the ordinary remedy for an invasion 
of personal interests in liberty.”29 The Bivens Court therefore allowed 
the suit against the federal agents to proceed under the theory that the 
cause of action could be implied from the face of the Fourth 
Amendment.30 The Bivens Court did not address whether “special 
                                                 
24 Tiefer, supra note 18, at 753. 
25 Finer, supra note 2, at 260. 
26 See Tiefer, supra note 18, at 761. 
27 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971) 
28 Id. at 392 (Internal citation omitted). 
29 Id. at 395. 
30 Id. at 397. 
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factors” or an alternative remedy required restraint in the absence of 
Congressional action on the issue.31 As such, it reserved answering 
those questions for later cases.32 
 
1. Bush v. Lucas 
 
In Bush v. Lucas, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
Bivens remedy does not exist when an alternative process will protect 
a constitutional liberty interest.33 The Bush Court grappled with the 
question of whether civil service employees could bring an action for 
damages when the employees’ rights were violated by their 
superiors.34 The Bush Court noted that “[t]he question is not what 
remedy the court should provide for a wrong that would otherwise go 
unredressed” because civil service employees were already entitled to 
a comprehensive set of remedies.35 Instead, the main issue before the 
court was “whether an elaborate remedial system . . . should be 
augmented by the creation of a new judicial remedy for the 
constitutional violation at issue.”36 Because the issue before it 
implicated a complex, existing regulatory structure, the Bush Court 
held that Congress was in a “far better position than a court” to 
determine whether a “new species of litigation” should be permitted.37 
Although the Bush Court couched its decision in terms of whether 
“special factors” preclude creation of a new remedy, the holding in 
Bush was interpreted in subsequent Supreme Court cases to mean that 
when an alternative, existing process for protecting a liberty interest 
                                                 
31 Id. at 396. 
32 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537 (2007). These cases will be discussed further infra. 
33 Bush, 462 U.S. at 390. 
34 Id. at 368. 
35 Id. at 388. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. at 389. 
6 
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exists, courts should refrain from providing a new remedy in 
damages.38 
2. Wilkie v. Robbins 
 
In Wilkie v. Robbins, the United States Supreme Court held that 
certain “special factors” can preclude the creation of a remedy in 
damages for a federal official’s violation of a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest.39 The Wilkie Court considered whether a 
Bivens remedy should be allowed in a case where federal officials 
violated a landowner’s property rights.40 In Wilkie, the Court found 
that “the forums of defense and redress . . . are a patchwork;” and that 
“[i]t would be hard to infer that Congress expected the judiciary to 
stay its Bivens hand, but equally hard to extract any clear lesson that 
Bivens” supported creation of a new claim.41 Because no adequate 
alternative remedy existed in this case, the Court moved to the second 
step of the Bivens test and examined whether any “special factors” 
precluded a new remedy in damages.42 The government’s argument 
that it was difficult to define limits “to legitimate zeal on the public’s 
behalf” ultimately won the Court over.43 The Wilkie Court reasoned 
that when government employees “push too hard for the Government’s 
benefit,” Congress was the best institution to provide a remedy 
because it could “tailor any remedy to the problem perceived, thus 
lessening the risk of raising a tide of suits threatening legitimate 
initiative on the part of the Government’s employees.”44 Justice 
Thomas wrote a concurrence, which Justice Scalia joined, that 
reiterated their position that “Bivens is a relic of the heady days in 
which this Court assumed common-law powers to create causes of 
                                                 
38 Wilkie, 551 U.S. at 550. 
39 Id. at 562 
40 Id. at 549. 
41 Id. at 554. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 562. 
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action,” and that “Bivens and its progeny should be limited ‘to the 
precise circumstances that they involved.’”45 
 
3. Carlson v. Green 
 
In Carlson v. Green, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
Bivens remedy for damages was available under the Eighth 
Amendment.46 In Carlson, an executrix brought a claim against 
federal prison officials for causing her son’s death.47 The executrix 
pleaded a violation of the Eight Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment under Bivens.48 Because this was the first Bivens 
action brought under the Eight Amendment, the Supreme Court 
analyzed whether any special factors counseled hesitation or if an 
alternative remedy existed for this type of constitutional violation.49 
The Supreme Court found that no special factors existed and even if 
allowing a Bivens action to proceed against prison officials, qualified 
immunity would ensure that they were not “inhibit[ed]” in performing 
their function.50 Next, the Supreme Court examined whether the 
Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) provided a sufficient alternative 
remedy.51 It concluded that the FTCA was not an alternative remedy 
because the congressional comments for the FTCA amendment 
indicated that Congress felt that Bivens and the FTCA were “parallel, 
complementary causes of action.”52 Because the two remedies were 
not meant to be mutually exclusive, and because Bivens remedies can 
be more effective when government officials violate a constitutionally-
protected liberty interests, the Supreme Court concluded that a Bivens 
                                                 
45 Id. at 568 (citing Correctional Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 75 
(2001)) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
46 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 23 (1980). 
47 Id. at 16. 
48 Id. at 17. 
49 Id. at 18–19. 
50 Id. at 19. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 19–20. 
8 
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remedy should exist when government officials violate an individual’s 
Eighth Amendment rights.53 
 
4. United States v. Stanley 
 
In United States v. Stanley, the United States Supreme Court held 
that a Bivens remedy is not available for injuries arising out of or in 
the course of military service activity.54 In Stanley, a serviceman was 
secretly given lysergic acid diethylamide (“LSD”) because the military 
wanted to understand its effects on humans.55 After being 
administered the drug, he underwent drastic personality changes that 
caused his discharge from the military and the dissolution of his 
marriage.56 After he learned that he was secretly administered the 
drug, he brought a claim against various military officials under the 
FTCA and Bivens.57 Although the Supreme Court had previously 
decided under Chappell v. Wallace58 that enlisted personnel cannot 
bring a Bivens claim against superior officers, it had not decided 
whether all Bivens claims brought by military personnel are barred.59 
The Supreme Court held that military personnel cannot bring Bivens 
claims for injuries “that ‘arise out of or are in the course of activity 
incident to service.’”60 It reached this holding by reasoning that 
because claims brought by military personnel under the FTCA are 
barred when they arise out of or are incident to service, any claims 
under Bivens m 61ust likewise be precluded.  




53 Id. at 20–23. 
54 United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987). 
55 Id. at 671. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 672. 
58 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). 
59 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 676. 
60 Id. at 684 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146 (1950). 
61 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 684. 
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III . VANCE V. RUMSFELD 
 
A. Factual Background 
 
Vance v. Rumsfeld arose from the alleged torture of two American 
citizens working for a PMF in Iraq.62 Donald Vance and Nathan Ertel 
traveled to Iraq in 2005 to work for the PMF, Shield Group Security 
(“SGS”).63 While performing their duties for SGS, they witnessed 
several actions that they believed to be illegal by SGS employees.64 
During a visit to Chicago, Vance contacted the FBI and reported what 
he had observed.65 He was assigned an FBI contact who requested that 
Vance continue to report on the suspicious activities of SGS 
employees.66 Vance did so and was put in contact with a U.S. official 
in Iraq.67 The official requested copies of certain documents on SGS’s 
computers, which Vance provided.68 SGS became suspicious of Vance 
and Ertel’s actions and on April 14, 2006, armed SGS employees 
confiscated the men’s access cards.69 Being effectively trapped in the 
“Red Zone,”70 Vance and Ertel contacted two U.S. officials to be 
rescued.71 They barricaded themselves in a room within the SGS 
compound and were eventually rescued by U.S. forces.72  
                                                 








70 The “Red Zone” refers to designated unsafe areas in Iraq. In Bagdad, there is 
a small “Green Zone” which houses a high security Multi-National Force-1 (“MNF-
1”) Compound. All parts of Baghdad outside of this compound are considered part 





Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 2
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol7/iss1/2
SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW                             Volume 7, Issue 1                               Fall 2011 
 
Following their rescue, they were taken to the U.S. Embassy and 
had all of their belongings seized.73 At the Embassy they were 
questioned by an FBI agent and U.S. Air Force Intelligence 
personnel.74 During the questioning, both men told the officials about 
their government contacts in the United States and Iraq.75 Following 
their interviews, they were allowed to sleep for a few hours and were 
awakened suddenly by armed guards who arrested them and took them 
to Camp Prosperity.76 Their arrest and detention was a result of being 
labeled as “security internees” affiliated with SGS.77 
Two days later they were transferred to Camp Cropper and 
subjected to repeated interrogation by military personnel.78 After 
several days at Camp Cropper, they were taken before a Detainee 
Status Board on April 26, 2006, to determine their legal status.79 On 
May 17, 2006, Major General John Gardner authorized Ertel’s 
release.80 On July 20, 2006, Vance was permitted to leave Camp 
Cropper several days after Major General Gardner authorized his 
release.81 Following their release, the men brought a Bivens claim 











76 Id. at 960. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. 
79 The opinion only states that the Detainee Status Board officially 
acknowledged that Ertel was an innocent civilian, there is nothing on the Board’s 
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B. District Court’s Decision 
 
1. Alternative Remedies Analysis82 
 
Judge Wayne Andersen, writing for the District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois, analyzed whether Rumsfeld’s motion to 
dismiss Vance and Ertel’s claims should be granted.83 Judge 
Andersen’s opinion gave only cursory treatment to whether alternative 
remedies were available to the men.84 This was largely due to 
Rumsfeld’s concession “that the [Detainee Treatment Act (“DTA”)] 
does not apply to the facts of th[e] case and does not provide a remedy 
to vindicate . . . constitutional rights.”85 Judge Andersen relied on the 
Supreme Court’s language in Davis v. Passman to conclude that the 
absence of an alternative remedy strongly supports the creation of a 
Bivens remedy because constitutional rights can become “precatory” 
without an enforcement mechanism.86 Having concluded that there 
was no alternative remedy and that there was “strong support” for 
creating a remedy, he moved onto the special factors analysis.87 
 
2. “Special Factors” Analysis 
 
Judge Andersen began his analysis of whether special factors 
precluded the creation of a Bivens remedy by rejecting Rumsfeld’s 
argument that a remedy should not be extended in this case because 
they have become “generally disfavored” by the courts.88 He reasoned 
that although the Supreme Court has been unwilling to create many 
                                                 
82 This Comment will only address the District Court and Seventh Circuit’s 
Bivens analysis, so the other aspects of those opinions will not be summarized or 
analyzed. 
83 Id. 
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new remedies under Bivens, this move “[did] not remove the 
availability of a Bivens remedy to federal courts tasked with 
adjudicating distinct constitutional violations.”89 
Judge Andersen then addressed the three special factors that 
Rumsfeld argued should preclude the creation of a Bivens remedy.90 
These factors included: separation of powers; misuse of the courts as a 
weapon to interfere with the war effort; and other serious adverse 
consequences for national defense.91 Judge Andersen reasoned that 
Vance and Ertel’s claims did not require significant oversight or 
military governance.92 He agreed that courts should still defer to the 
military because judges do not have the experience or expertise to 
control the military.93 Because the court was merely being asked 
whether it could provide a remedy for harms that had already occurred 
during a period of war, Judge Andersen concluded that allowing a 
Bivens remedy would not “infringe ‘on the core role of the 
military.’”94 
Another factor that Judge Andersen found important was that the 
plaintiffs were both American citizens at the time of their detention 
and alleged torture.95 These two points were of importance because 
the case that Rumsfeld primarily relied upon, In re Iraq and 
Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, did not create a Bivens remedy 
because of the litigants’ status as non-citizens.96 That case also 
addressed the importance of isolating the military official from claims 
that “call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts . 
. . from the military offensive abroad.”97 Although Judge Andersen did 
                                                 
89 Id. at 973. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. at 973–74. 
93 Id. at 973. 
94 Id. at 974 (citing Padilla v. Yoo, 633 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1027–28). 
95 Vance I, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 973–74. 
96 Id. at 974. 
97 Id. (citing In re Iraq and Afghanistan Detainees Litigation, 479 F. Supp. 2d 
85, 105 (2007)). 
13 
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agree that claimants such as those in the In re Iraq litigation should 
generally not have access to the courts, he determined that high-
ranking officials should not have a “blank check” in using their war 
powers to violate the constitutional liberties of Am 98erican citizens.  
                                                
 
C. Seventh Circuit’s Decision 
 
1. Majority’s Alternative Remedies Analysis 
 
Judge Hamilton, writing for the majority, agreed with Judge 
Andersen in the District Court that there was no alternative remedy 
available to Vance and Ertel.99 Although Rumsfeld conceded that there 
was no alternative remedy in the District Court, the issue was raised in 
an amicus brief filed by former Department of Defense officials.100 
They argued that Vance and Ertel were not entitled to a remedy under 
Bivens because the plaintiffs could have taken advantage of the 
Geneva Conventions, the Coalition of Provisional Authority 
Memorandum # 3, or the Uniform Code of Military Justice.101 The 
amici argued that Vance and Ertel had an alternative remedy because 
those laws provided them with an avenue to complain about their 
treatment.102 
Judge Hamilton rejected the amici’s argument for three 
reasons.103 First, he reasoned that the alternative remedy would be 
insufficient because of the nature of the plaintiffs’ claims—that those 
at the top of the chain of command were responsible for the violation 
of their constitutional rights.104 Second, he reasoned that the ability to 
complain would at best stop the violation, but it would not provide any 
 
98 Vance 1, 694 F. Supp. 2d at 974. 
99 Vance v. Rumsfeld (“Vance II”), 653 F.3d 591, 614 (2011). 




104 Id. at 613–14. 
14 
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sanctions against the officials who caused the violation.105 Finally, he 
concluded that the remedy was illusory at best because Vance and 
Ertel had complained, but the Camp Cropper commander informed 
them “there was nothing he could do about their treatment.”106 Judge 
Hamilton also compared the remedy raised by the amici to the two 
remedies the Supreme Court found sufficient in Schwiker and Bush.107 
He found that both of those cases involved “elaborate and 
comprehensive” remedies providing “meaningful safeguards” and that 
there was no similar system for American citizens who claimed they 
were tortured in a war zone by government officials.108 Having 
concluded that there was no remedy available to Vance and Ertel, 
Judge Hamilton proceeded to the second step of the Bivens analysis. 
 
2. Majority’s “Special Factors” Analysis 
 
Judge Hamilton began the special factors analysis by noting that 
Vance and Ertel were asserting a relatively narrow claim whereas 
Rumsfeld was arguing for the immunity of every military official in a 
war zone.109 He found great importance in the fact that Vance and 
Ertel’s claim did not challenge military policy; it merely requested a 
remedy in damages for the violation that had already occurred.110 
After his initial comparison between the scope and nature of the claim 
and defense, he analyzed the precedent supporting Vance and Ertel’s 
claim.111 First, he noted that it is “well established” that prisoners can 
seek a remedy in damages under Bivens if they have their rights 
violated by government officials.112 Next, he noted that it is also “well 
established” that American citizens can seek a remedy in damages 
                                                 
105 Id. at 614. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. 
108 Id.  
109 Id. 
110 Id.  
111 Id. at 615. 
112 Id. at 615–16. 
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under Bivens if their rights are violated by military personnel.113 He 
also found that the Constitution’s restrictions apply in any location 
where government officials act and that their powers are not “absolute 
and unlimited” merely because they act outside of U.S. borders.114 
Finally, he concluded that a claim could proceed against Rumsfeld 
because although Cabinet members and other high-ranking officials in 
the Executive Branch are entitled to qualified immunity, they do not 
have absolute immunity from constitutional claims.115 
After considering the precedent supporting Vance and Ertel’s 
claim, Judge Hamilton addressed the two special factors raised by 
Rumsfeld: First, that the courts should refrain from interfering in 
military affairs and matters of national security; and second, that 
congressional action indicates that detainees should not be afforded a 
remedy under Bivens.116 Because Vance and Ertel were merely 
challenging the violation of their rights and were not mounting a broad 
challenge to military policy, Judge Hamilton found that the first 
special factor was not a reason to preclude a Bivens remedy.117 He 
concluded that the judiciary would not interfere with military decision-
making by allowing a Bivens remedy here because any claims like 
those of Vance and Ertel would be heard “well after the fact” and that 
they were “grave” and “rare.”118 He reasoned that although litigation 
concerning matters of national security and military policy necessarily 
implicates classified and other sensitive information, “judicial 
intrusion into matters of national security” does not exist where the 
law provides various privileges to protect state secrets.119 Judge 
Hamilton buttressed his conclusion that the adjudication of such 
claims does not threaten separation of powers through Boumediene v. 
                                                 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 617. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 618, 622. 
117 Id. at 618. 
118 Id. 
119 Id. (citing Wilson v. Libby, 535 F.3d 697, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2008)). 
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Bush and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld.120 Because the Supreme Court found 
that the three branches of government should play “complementary 
roles” in the realm of national security, he concluded that it was 
appropriate for the judiciary to involve itself in matters of national 
security in order to safeguard Constitutional rights like the ones at 
issue in Vance.121 The final point Judge Hamilton addressed under the 
first special factor was the distinction between citizens and non-
citizens.122 Judge Hamilton distinguished the nature of the claim in 
Vance from the cases raised by Rumsfeld where other Federal Circuit 
courts denied a Bivens remedy to non-citizens.123 The concern about 
non-citizens using the courts to interfere in matters of national security 
was the driving reason why the other Circuits denied a Bivens remedy 
in those cases, and Judge Hamilton found that they were sufficiently 
different from the claim in Vance because of the “grave breach of our 
most basic social compact.”124 Because allowing a Bivens remedy 
would at worst cause slight interference in military affairs and national 
security, Judge Hamilton determined that this special factor should not 
bar Vance and Ertel’s claim.125 
The next special factor that Judge Hamilton addressed was 
whether congressional action indicated that it did not intend to afford 
detainees a remedy under Bivens.126 Rumsfeld argued that 
                                                 
120 Vance II, 653 F.3d at 619; Boumediene v. Bush, 552 U.S. 723 (2008) 
(holding that enemy combatants held in Guantanamo are entitled to habeas corpus 
review and that the Military Commissions Act of 2006 was an unconstitutional 
suspension of the right to habeas corpus); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) 
(O’Connor, J., plurality) (holding that Congress authorized the detention of enemy 
combatants but that due process required that combatants have a meaningful 
opportunity to challenge their status and that the government must provide notice of 
the charges and an opportunity for the combatant to be heard, although the normal 
procedural protections of a trial need not be imposed on the government) 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 619–20. 
123 Id. 
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congressional intent on the issue precluded creation of a remedy 
because Congress did not create a private cause of action in various 
statutes controlling the treatment of detainees.127 Judge Hamilton 
rejected that argument and cited numerous statutes which authorized 
and regulated private causes of action against government officials 
accused of torturing non-citizens.128 He determined that accepting 
Rumsfeld’s argument would create an “anomalous result” because it 
would allow Rumsfeld to be sued in a foreign country for torturing an 
American citizen, if that country prohibited torture, but not in the 
United States.129 Judge Hamilton reasoned that the Torture Victim 
Protection Act, upon which Vance and Ertel relied, showed that 
Congress “[s]urely . . . would rather have such claims against U.S. 
officials heard in U.S. courts,” and that it was appropriate to allow a 
Bivens remedy in Vance.130 
 
3. Dissent’s “Special Factors” Analysis 
 
Judge Manion, writing in dissent, provided five reasons why he 
disagreed with the majority on whether a Bivens remedy should be 
created in this case.131 He began by noting that it was 
“understandable” why the majority thought there “must be a remedy” 
in the present case.132 He was not unsympathetic toward Vance and 
Ertel’s claim, and he agreed that the allegations, if true, had significant 
constitutional implications.133 His disagreement centered on whether 
the Seventh Circuit should extend a remedy in the face of the Supreme 
Court’s warning that Congress is the appropriate body to create new 
remedies.134 He noted that the other circuits which were presented 
                                                 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id. at 623. 
130 Id. at 624. 
131 Id. at 629. 
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with the question of whether a Bivens remedy should be created for 
allegations of constitutional violations had answered in the 
negative.135 Because of the consensus amongst the circuits which had 
addressed the question, he concluded that it was Congress’s role to 
create any r 136emedy.  
                                                
Judge Manion determined that the special factors analysis was 
more “straightforward” than what the majority made it out to be 
because of the agreement in the two circuits which had addressed the 
question.137 He reasoned that it was a “commonsense understanding” 
for courts to exhibit restraint when interfering in military and national 
security affairs and that the Seventh Circuit went against that 
understanding by creating a remedy in the face of lacking Supreme 
Court precedent on the matter.138 
Judge Manion next turned to the precedent that the majority cited 
and noted that the special factors present in the cases they relied upon 
did not include the “legitimate special factors of national security and 
military policy.”139 He determined that the precedent relied upon by 
the majority only dealt with whether a Bivens remedy could be 
brought for violations that occurred within the United States.140 
Because of the nature of actions taken by a governmental official in a 
war zone, he concluded that Congress, and not the courts, was the 
appropriate arbiter to establish the “‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘when,’ ‘where,’ 
‘why,’ and ‘how much’” of a private right of action.141 
Judge Manion then concluded that the difficulties inherent in 
judicial review of military action were significantly greater than those 
stated by the majority.142 The majority relied upon the state secret 









142 Id. at 630. 
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but Judge Manion determined that the privilege required “significant 
judicial intrusion” into military and national security policy.143 Again, 
he reasoned that Congress was best placed to balance such concerns, 
especially because of the way in which the existence of a civil remedy 
could affect the split-second decisions required on a battlefield.144 
Next, he concluded that the majority was incorrect in 
distinguishing from the cases in other circuits on the sole fact that 
Vance and Ertel were American citizens.145 He reasoned that their 
status was a minor factor compared to the three special factors relied 
upon by the other circuits: “national security interests, confidential 
information, and the risks posed by proceedings in open court.”146 
Because the decisions in those courts were based on similar special 
factors present in Vance, Judge Manion determined that Vance and 
Ertel’s status as American citizens was not in itself sufficient to depart 
from the other circuits’ decisions and establish a Bivens remedy.147 
Judge Manion’s fourth reason for disagreement was the majority’s 
reliance on Supreme Court habeas corpus cases that provided limited 
judicial oversight of military decision making.148 He again reiterated 
his point that the Supreme Court cautioned judicial intervention when 
there are special factors.149 He determined that the special factors 
present in Vance were sufficient to counsel hesitation and required 
Congress to decide the question of whether a remedy should be 
created.150 
Judge Manion’s final point cautioned against the far reaching 
nature of the majority’s decision.151 He noted that there was an 
“enormous number” of contractors working for PMFs and that the 









151 Id. at 632. 
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creation of a Bivens remedy for these individuals would open a 
“Pandora’s Box” of claims.152 Because of the differences between 
military detention and domestic prisons, Judge Manion foresaw 
“potentially thousands” of claims arising from the detention of 
American civilians working for PMFs in a war zone.153 He therefore 
determined that it was inappropriate for the court to extend a Bivens 
remedy without any guidance from Congress.154 
 
IV – ANALYSIS: PLAYING BY BIG BOY RULES 
 
A. Opening Pandora’s Box: Vance’s Potential Impact on the Way 
America Conducts Foreign Policy 
 
This comment agrees with Judge Manion that Vance opens a 
“Pandora’s Box” of potential claims.155 At their highest levels in the 
Iraq War, there were approximately 150,000 contractors working for 
PMFs.156 That number almost matches the highest level of troops – 
166,300 in October 2007.157 Judge Manion was correct in pointing out 
that the drastic difference between military detention and domestic 
prisons would be the basis for numerous claims, even if many 
contractors are former military personnel.158 Although the contractors 
themselves may ultimately be innocent or even cooperating with the 
U.S. government, they should still be detained if they are connected 
with a PMF which is suspected of illegal activity or supporting enemy 
combatants. Judge Hamilton concluded that the narrow nature of 
Vance and Ertel’s claim did not mount a broad challenge to military 




155 Id.  
156 Finer, supra note 2, at 260 
157 CNN, Chart: U.S. Troop Levels in Iraq, available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/10/21/world/meast/chart-us-troops-iraq/index.html 
(Accessed Nov. 28,2011) 
158 Vance II, 653 F.3d at 632. 
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policy, but his conclusion failed to consider the impact that the 
availability of such a claim would have on military policy.159 The 
American way of waging war has changed, and military officials now 
need to consider how and where to use PMFs. The availability of a 
Bivens claim for American citizens working as contractors is a 
distraction that will hinder the effectiveness of the U.S. military. Under 
the Majority’s opinion, American military officials must now also 
consider whether they will violate citizen contractor’s constitutional 
rights when making the split second decisions required in war.160 
Vance could become the basis for any future claims brought by citizen 
contractors, and those claims would have an undeniable impact on 
implementation and effectiveness of military policy.161 
 
B. The Seventh Circuit’s “Special Factors” Dispute 
 
The majority and dissent’s disagreement over whether special 
factors barred Vance and Ertel’s claim seems to rest on which branch 
of the government should create a remedy for citizens detained and 
tortured in a warzone.162 The majority concluded that the courts were 
the appropriate forum because there were no special factors counseling 
restraint. The dissent, on the other hand, concluded that Congress was 
the appropriate forum because establish the “‘who,’ ‘what,’ ‘when,’ 
‘where,’ ‘why,’ and ‘how much’” of a private right of action.163 This 
comment agrees that the dissent was correct in concluding that the 
special factors analysis was straightforward and that Congress is best 
placed to balance the concerns of protecting constitutional rights 
against national security and military policy. Although a further special 
factor will be addressed in the next section, the special factors raised 
by the majority and dissent lead to the conclusion that the court should 
have stayed its hand in Vance. Although the courts do have a place in 
                                                 
159 Id. at 618. 
160 See id. at 631 
161 See id. at 632 
162 See id. at 629 
163 Id. at 629. 
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matters of national security, especially when Constitutional rights are 
at stake, the Supreme Court has consistently cautioned against 
extending Bivens remedies into any new context.164 The majority 
ignored this caution, and the consensus of the other circuits who had 
already addressed the question of whether a Bivens remedy was 
available for the violation of constitutional rights in a warzone, when it 
extended a Bivens remedy in Vance.  
 
C. Big Boy Rules: 
The Problem with Focusing on Vance and Ertel’s Status as Citizens 
 
The majority’s argument in Vance places great weight on Vance 
and Ertel’s status as citizens and concludes that their claim should be 
allowed to proceed as a result.165 Other circuits had already addressed 
whether Bivens claims should be allowed when non-citizens’ rights 
were violated in Iraq, so the majority needed to distinguish from those 
cases.166 The majority misrepresented the facts in Vance, however, 
when it concluded that Vance and Ertel were merely citizens. Under 
the law, they were civilians “accompanying the force” during 
“contingency operation[s]” in Iraq.167 As such, they were subject to 
the UCMJ168 and their status was more analogous to a member of the 
military. Because they are similarly situated to a member of the armed 
forces, they should either be classified as quasi-military personnel or 
be considered military personnel when bringing a Bivens claim. The 
Supreme Court has already established a special factor to consider 
when a Bivens claim is brought by a member of the armed forces,169 
and that factor should apply to quasi-military personnel because many 
                                                 
164 See, e.g., Corr. Serv. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001). 
165 See Vance II, 653 F.3d at 622. 
166 Id. (citing to Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, (D.C. Cir. 2011); Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
167 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10). 
168 See Hamaguchi, supra note 17, at 1064–66 for an explanation of why the 
statute will likely be found to be constitutional and subjects U.S. citizens to UCMJ 
jurisdiction when accompanying the force in a contingency operation. 
169 See United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 684 (1987). 
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of the same concerns which prompted the creation of that factor apply 
to quasi-military personnel. There is significant legislative control170 
over the “rights, duties, and responsibilities”171 of PMFs and that 
control is the basis for either applying the Stanley special factor to 
quasi-military personnel or creating a new special factor for quasi-
military personnel. Applying this factor would bar any Bivens claims 
which “‘arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to [quasi-
military] service.’”172 If this special factor were applied to Vance and 
Ertel’s claim, it would be barred under Bivens because the  
injury—their detention and alleged torture—arose out of their service 
to SGS. If they had not been working for SGS, they would not have 
been detained and tortured along with the other SGS contractors. 
Although they were providing evidence to the U.S. government, the 
military was still justified in detaining them to determine if they were 
“security threats” because of SGS’s illegal activities.  
 
D. A Proposed Solution:  
Learning to Stop Worrying and Love “Special Factors” 
 
Judge Manion was correct in concluding that the courts should 
wait until Congress acts to create a remedy for violations of 
constitutional rights in a warzone.173 This is because the American 
way of waging war has changed, but there are no laws that fully 
address this shift. Although Congress has passed laws that subject 
civilians assisting the military in contingency operations to UCMJ 
jurisdiction174, it has not fully regulated PMFs. To do so, it must 
answer the “who,” “what,” “when,” “where,” “why,” and “how much” 
of a private right of action for U.S. citizens who’s rights are violated. 
                                                 
170 See 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10); Tiefer, supra note 18, at 754–57 
171 Stanley, 483 U.S. at 679. 
172 Id. at 684 (citing Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 146(1950)). 
173 Vance II, 653 F.3d 591, 628 (2011). 
174 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) 
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To the question of “who,” Congress will have to address several 
different classes of individuals. The vast number175 of contractors 
working for PMFs alone will likely make this a herculean task. Within 
this group, Congress will need to distinguish between the quasi-
military personnel and those who merely provide support or consulting 
services.176 In addition, there are those who merely report or provide 
humanitarian assistance. Congress will need to distinguish between 
these individuals and will have to weigh their rights against the 
functions they perform and the likelihood that their rights will be 
violated in a warzone. Congress will also need to address who can be 
held liable and what level of immunity that person has. 
In answering “what,” Congress will have to determine what 
constitutes a violation of a citizen’s constitutional rights. As Judge 
Manion pointed out, there is a vast difference between military 
detention and imprisonment in domestic prisons.177 All of the Bivens 
precedent of Eighth Amendment violations has focused on domestic 
prisons,178 so Congress will need to set guidelines for what is and is 
not appropriate treatment for U.S. citizens held in military detention in 
a warzone. Again, careful attention must be paid to who is being held 
in detention. Congress will also need to establish guidelines for other 
constitutional rights because the Eighth Amendment is not the only 
right that will likely be violated in a warzone. 
The question of “when” will require a careful weighing of 
interests because of the ever-changing nature of a warzone. If evidence 
of a constitutional violation is to be preserved, claims must be allowed 
to proceed relatively quickly. Although this may conflict with the 
effective implementation of military policy and strategy, when a 
violation is flagrant enough to state a claim, the victim of the violation 
must be allowed to move quickly enough to preserve evidence so that 
they can successfully raise their claim at a later date. The claim itself 
must be heard later, however, as any evidence which forms a basis of 
                                                 
175 See Finer, supra note 2, at 260. 
176 See Tiefer, supra note 18, at 753. 
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the claim may reveal current national security or military strategies. 
While the courts can use the state secrets privilege to protect sensitive 
information, the best protection is time because if the strategies are no 
longer relevant, their discovery will cause less harm to the military 
effort. 
The best answer for “where” is the federal judiciary because, 
although the courts-martial are experienced with matters of military 
policy, courts-martial do not have the same wealth of experience in 
protecting constitutional rights. Bivens remedies have been litigated 
for forty years in the federal judiciary, so federal judges are no 
strangers to the contours of the doctrine. Congress should also 
consider establishing a tribunal, which could be situated in or near the 
warzone, to hear the preliminary aspects of a litigant’s claim and 
determine whether it should proceed. 
The question of “why” is easily answered because of the changing 
way in which America wages war. There is a need to concretely define 
the various aspects of claims for violations of constitutional rights in a 
warzone, because once the courts have opened Pandora’s Box, they 
will struggle to define the contours of the rights in a warzone and the 
appropriate remedies. They will have to do so against the backdrop of 
sensitive information, national security, military policy, and different 
classes of plaintiffs, and likely will struggle until guidance is given by 
the Supreme Court. Congress can bypass this process by enacting 
legislations which clearly establishes the rights and remedies each 
class is entitled to and accommodates the current realities of the 
American way of waging war. 
In answering “how much,” Congress will have to weigh how 
prevalent these claims will become against the severity of the 
violation. It will also have to account for the differences between 
treatment in military detention centers and domestic prisons. Because 
of the demands of war, military detention can be significantly harsher 
than domestic prisons. Congress should therefore limit or adjust 
damages because violations which would otherwise be serious in a 
domestic prison could be commonplace in military detention in a 
warzone. This would also allow the military to effectively implement 
its policies without large damage awards acting as a hindrance. 
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In its effort to establish a Bivens remedy because there “must be a 
remedy” when allegations as serious as torture are raised, the Seventh 
Circuit in Vance overstepped its bounds and answered a question best 
left to Congress.179 The reasoning employed by the majority 
demonstrates how a focus on constitutional rights obscured the true 
issue of whether the court should create a remedy. The dissent was 
correct in concluding that courts are not the best forum to determine 
whether a remedy should exist for violations of constitutional rights in 
a warzone. Because matters of national security and military policy are 
best left to Congress, especially in light of the unique status of quasi-
military personnel, it is the appropriate arbiter for creating a remedy. 
Therefore, Congress must act to define the “who,” “what,” “when,” 
“where,” “why,” and “how much” of a private right of action for U.S. 
citizens who’s rights are violated in a warzone. Once Congress has 
spoken on the issue, the federal judiciary will be able to fulfill its role 
of safeguarding citizens’ rights. 
                                                 
179 Vance II, 653 F.3d at 628. 
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